Deluge
The Influence of Business on U.S. Policy towards Nicaragua, 1893-1909“It has been Nicaragua’s fate, often an evil fate like that of a woman too lovely, to be desired by many nations.”[1]
“The Americans were there to make money as quickly as possible and then leave.”
-An American woman describing the situation in Bluefields, Nicaragua, 1907. [2]
From the period 1900 until 1909, economic considerations were consistently the primary motivators of United States policy towards Nicaragua. Following the Spanish-American war, the United States began to expand its economic and military influence in Central America and the Caribbean basin. As some historians suggest, a significant motivation in this expansion was to secure foreign markets in order to relieve a saturated domestic market. By controlling a country’s economic system either directly or through US-client regimes, the US would be able to reorder a country to make it more conducive to trade with the US. The oversight of the US would bring stability to the region, protect existing US investments from seizure, limit unpopular trade barriers such as tariffs and duties, provide a sizeable market to relieve the glut of a saturated domestic market, and prime the region for future investment and development. Accompanying the economic penetration was a build up of US military presence in Central America, most notably around the Panama Canal. The military itself was the brutish aspect of economic expansion, providing concrete repercussions to those who were noncompliant with US policy objectives. As one historian wrote in 1929, “Step by step- Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Virgin Islands- the Caribbean has become an ‘American Lake.’[3]
In Nicaragua, this policy of hemispheric hegemony resulted in the overthrow of President Jose Santos Zelaya by a rival Nicaraguan faction with the aid of US businessmen in the country and the approval of US statesmen seeking to expand the country’s economic influence. US investors in Nicaragua played an important part in shaping the way that the state department perceived Zelaya by casting him as an unstable, unlawful, and belligerent despot- in short, a liability to US commercial ambitions. These commercial interests in Nicaragua dovetailed with the US government’s objective of hemispheric domination, stimulating and shaping US policy towards Nicaragua, resulting in the ouster of Zelaya in 1909 and his replacement with a more economically conciliatory regime.
Zelaya, Concessions, and the Canal
When Zelaya seized power in 1893, he implemented a policy of centralization and an elaborate system of concessions that would form the basis of future US-Nicaragua tensions. He began in 1894 by consolidating the Mosquito Coast through force. The Mosquito Coast had long been the center of British and American investments. Due to its geographical isolation, the Mosquito Coast, and especially the cities of Bluefields and Greytown, were more commercially connected to New Orleans than to Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua. A neo-liberal, Zelaya shared the ideals of nationalism and economic and cultural progress, or what has been called the ideal of a “cosmopolitan nation-state,” with members of Nicaragua’s elite and growing middle class.[4] To that end, he sought to incorporate the far-flung regions of the country, including the Mosquito Coast. He wanted to bring the lucrative business community of Bluefields, made up primarily of foreigners and long perceived as smugglers of contraband, under his control.[5] Zelaya’s attempt to impose governmental regulation on the coast created unrest within the business community, who had become accustomed to the mild local government. One member of the US Legation in Managua blamed Zelaya for “an autocratic and militarist manner, as well as heavy taxation.”[6] US business in the region resented Zelaya’s attempt to impose governmental regulation over the region, which they had previously controlled with minimal government interference. The Mosquito Coast, and the city of Bluefields in particular, would continue to serve as the locus of American power and influence within Nicaragua.
At the same time that Zelaya was consolidating the far-reaches of Nicaragua, he was doling out large concessions to foreign investors in mining, agriculture, electrical works, and lumbering. The concessions usually allowed the grantee access to a certain commodity or industry for a specified length of time. In this contractual agreement, the concession holder paid a one-time fee followed by smaller annual payments and agreed to undertake infrastructure improvements within Nicaragua, such as building ports and laying railroad tracks.[7] A majority of important concessions went to American businesses. For example, Zelaya granted the George D. Emery Company a lumbering concession that reportedly covered one-fifth of the entire country.[8] Again, in 1903, Zelaya granted a mining concession to the US & Nicaragua Company, which later purchased the gold-producing mine of La Luz y Los Angeles.[9] Both of these companies would play important roles in influencing US policy towards Zelaya in 1909. In addition, most concessions allowed companies to import the supplies necessary for operations duty free. Not only were supplies directly tied with operations allowed in (such as heavy machinery), but also all provisions, such as canned goods, that might be necessary for company employees. The waiver of these duties amounted to a substantial sum. A report from the State Department stated that “The amount of duties they would have paid on their imports would by far exceed the amount annually paid (for the concession).”[10] In short, Zelaya did not impose prohibitively high fees upon foreign companies working within his country. On the contrary, he encouraged US investment through easily acquired, cheap concessions and did not impose heavy-handed measures.
Zelaya encouraged these arrangements for a number of reasons. For one, Zelaya believed that by granting foreigners concessions, he would hasten the development of the country towards a progressive, modern nation-state. In fact, it is often overlooked that, despite his autocratic style of rule, Zelaya more than any other president implemented measures to modernize the country. He opened schools across the country, encouraged the Nicaraguan-dominated coffee trade through subsidies, and improved communication by building railways.[11] The desire for personal enrichment also played its part; Zelaya benefited from monopolies that he held that supplied the operators of the concessions with things like fresh meat and dynamite.
Besides extensive ties with US businessmen, Zelaya also actively pursued relations with the US from 1893 until 1903 to build a transisthmian canal. The United States had long expressed interest in building a canal that would link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From a military perspective, the canal would allow rapid deployment of forces on either side of the continent, enabling the US to become a world power. From an economic perspective, the canal would lower shipping costs and allow manufacturers along the East coast to compete for Asian markets.[12] Plans for a transisthmian canal were long-standing. In 1850, the United States signed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England which provided for a neutral canal zone across the isthmus.[13] Significantly, Nicaragua was not consulted in these negotiations. As with the concessions, Zelaya desired the canal for the projected economic benefits that would accompany the canal. Until 1903, when the US opted to build the canal through Panama, US-Zelaya relations were generally amiable. Zelaya openly courted the US, allowing surveyors to begin plans for the canal. In 1902, he even went so far as to concede to the US perpetual ownership of the canal along with a six-mile wide strip of land along it and the right to station troops there.[14] However, negotiations eventually stumbled due to the actions of lobbyists for the Panamanian route. Zelaya, who had been counting on the canal for years, was devastated. Following the decision to build the canal through Panama, relations between Zelaya and the US began to sour. Still hoping to salvage the plan for a canal, Zelaya began to court Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, but with no success.[15] Zelaya’s actions angered the US who sought to occupy the sole hegemonic position within the Western Hemisphere. His attempts to assert Nicaragua’s sovereignty by having another country besides the United States build the canal collided with the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted that no other power was to have significant economic stakes within any Latin American country.
Prior to 1903, it would be difficult to portray Zelaya as at all hostile to the United States. If anything, the French-educated Neo-Liberal president found in his Northern neighbor a model that he wished his country would emulate. He believed that by bringing foreigners into Nicaragua through generous concessions, Nicaragua’s own nascent economy would benefit directly through trade and improvements in infrastructure, as well as by being provided a role model to improve the “natural indolence and depravity” of Nicaraguan workers.[16]
It was the issue of the canal that first drew the US government into serious conflict with the Zelaya government. Not only were his overtures to other world powers contrary to US regional strategy in which it would dominate its Southern neighbors, but Zelaya perceived the decision to build the canal in Panama as a slight. Thereafter, Zelaya began to investigate much more closely whether or not the concessions which he had doled out to Americans were in compliance, resulting in a number of cancellations which further strained relations between the US and Nicaragua.
The Role of Business in Overthrowing Zelaya
Relations between the US and Zelaya government which were already strained due to the issue of the canal, snapped when Zelaya began a series of cancellations of US businesses, foremost among them the George D. Emery Company mahogany concession in 1907. The Emery claim was an impressive concession. Sam Spellman, the company’s manager, estimated that its annual profits averaged $186,000, a sizeable sum considering that the initial fee paid to Zelaya’s government for it had been $200,000.[17] In 1906, Zelaya investigated the Emery claim and declared that they had defaulted on their contract, having neglected to build 50 miles of railway and tend to reforestation.[18] Furthermore, Zelaya complained that the company was engaging in illegal trade, selling their own duty-free goods on the market.[19] Zelaya ordered Emery Company to pay $500,000 for the damages.[20] The Emery Company objected and brought the suit before an arbitration court, which included Samuel Weil, the mayor of Bluefields and a staunch ally of US business interests in the region. The court fined Emery the paltry sum of $12,000 and Zelaya, greatly angered, cancelled the concession outright in 1907.[21] This was to become the most visible and persistent source of tension between the US and Zelaya.
It is important to remember, however, that while the Emery claim was a major stressor in US-Zelaya tensions, the US was already implementing a policy of regional consolidation and control. Articulated by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the US pledged itself to pursue a proactive policy of regulating and intervening in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. Whereas the Monroe Doctrine aimed to form an exclusionary order in Latin America, stating that any attempt of European powers to extend undue influence in Latin America could not be done without “endangering [US] peace and happiness,” the Roosevelt Corollary extended the Monroe Doctrine to include threats originating from internal, indigenous sources.[22] It argued that the US had not only the right, but also the duty to intervene in order to ensure that its neighbors were “stable, orderly, and prosperous.”[23] Furthermore, the US endorsed a policy of “preventative intervention,” which explicitly called for the US, “however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.” Tellingly, the US alone was to decide what actions constituted these flagrant cases of wrongdoing and impotence, allowing significant room in interpretation. The US began to consolidate its holdings throughout Latin America immediately following the Spanish-American war in 1898. For instance, the US made Cuba into a virtual protectorate through the Platt Amendment, which arranged the economy to favor US sugar producers in the country and simultaneously stipulated that the US had the right to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs whenever it felt it necessary. The Platt Amendment would become the model for US-Caribbean relations for the next few decades. The US also began seizing customs houses of various Caribbean Republics such as the Dominican Republic, after these countries defaulted on European loans, bringing European warships or their threat near.[24] The US, concerned about the presence of European military vessels and the opportunity for European powers to exert its influences in the United States’ own sphere of influence, took charge of the customs houses of these Latin American countries to ensure that their debts were paid on time.
It was in this context that Emery protested to the US government of Zelaya’s action. Official policy was already set to intervene in Latin America if it deemed it justified. In January of 1907, three weeks after losing its concession, Emery urged the US to send a warship to Nicaragua to intercede on its behalf.[25] It is significant that Emery felt that their request for US military aid in order to protect their own business endeavor would be considered and possibly granted. While the US did not act on this request immediately, it does illustrate that the US government had a close relationship with its merchants and it might, given the right circumstances, commit US military resources to protect these merchants and to advance its own designs of regional hegemony. Emery appealed to the US for assistance in arbitration after its cancellation, calling Zelaya’s action illegal and demanding reparations for the money that they lost. dragged on for two years, during which time relations between Zelaya and the US became increasingly hostile.
However, the US was more aggressive in its demands for a satisfactory settlement than Nicaragua. The Emery claim in many ways influenced the way in which US State Department officials perceived the Zelaya government, and it also provided a justification for the build up of tensions that would allow the US to intervene and impose an economic system favorable to US business and bankers. Secretary of State Knox, who was known for being more aggressive in foreign interactions than former Secretary of State Elihu Root, repeatedly warned Zelaya that the United States was losing patience with the “delays and the petty annoyances” concerning the Emery Claim.[26] In March of 1909, Knox sent a note that essentially amounted to an ultimatum, stating that further delays would result in “decided action,” a policy that met with “unqualified approval from the president and his advisors.”[27] However, up until this point, Zelaya claimed that he had not been able to obtain from the company a statement showing the exact amount of its claims.[28] Thus, in March 1909, the State Department sternly stated its willingness to use force to compel a decision in the Emery claim. The US government was willing to intervene on behalf of business in foreign countries. It is interesting to note that newspapers from this time tell repeatedly of an imminent lessening of US-Zelaya tensions. One such article asserts that “Zelaya has yielded much” in his demands in Emery’s arbitration and that a solution to the problem was well on its way.[29] The optimism was misguided.
As the Emery claim continued to drag on, Knox received notice that Zelaya intended to annul the US & Nicaragua concession, a company with which he had close connections having acted as their legal council. The president of the company at that time wrote to Knox and appealed for “protection in the premises” and pointed out that the company was owned by Pittsburgh interests, with which Knox was closely affiliated.[30] The antagonism between US businesses and Zelaya influenced the way in which State Department officials viewed the Zelaya regime and merged with the existing US policy objective of regional hegemony.
The Revolution Knocks
General Estrada, governor of Bluefields, General Chamorro, and Adolfo Diaz, leaders of the rebellion against Zelaya, may have been Nicaraguan, but the rebellion was fomented by Americans in Nicaragua, funded by American businesses in Bluefields, and wholly dependent for its success upon American military power, which had been called forth with the stated objective of protecting American citizens’ property while remaining neutral. When the State Department heard from Thomas P. Moffat, consul to Bluefields, that an insurrection would be taking place, Secretary of State Knox was ready to see Zelaya removed from power. Zelaya had repeatedly gone against the economic interests of the US, such as when he courted powers other than the US to build a canal and cancelled lucrative concessions to American businessmen. Furthermore, Zelaya approached the Ethelburga syndicate of London for a loan of 1,125,000 pounds sterling, a move that directly challenged US economic supremacy in the region.[31]
As stated, Bluefields was the stronghold of American business within Nicaragua and these businesses’ agitation against Zelaya and their attempts to install a less intrusive government were not without precedent. In 1899, General Juan Pablo Reyes, the governor of the Mosquito Coast from 1896 to 1899, raised an insurrection against Zelaya. A young Adolfo Diaz and Emiliano Chamorro joined Reyes, along with 42 American riflemen fighting alongside revolutionary forces.[32] Diaz would later become an employee of La Luz y Los Angeles Company, which was owned by the US and which had extensive ties with State Department officials, particularly Secretary Knox. In addition to contributing actual manpower, American merchants at Bluefields continued to pay duties to the customs house in the port of Bluefields even after it had fallen into Reye’s hands, thereby knowingly funding an illegal rebellion against the legitimate government of Nicaragua.[33] When Zelaya declared the duties paid to Reyes illegitimate and demanded that they pay to him what they had paid to Reyes, the merchants refused.
In 1909, a similar situation arose, but this time it successfully led to the ousting of Zelaya from Nicaragua. Again, the role of American merchants and the tacit support of the American government played an important role in fomenting the rebellion and affecting its successful outcome. As with the Reyes Rebellion, American merchants provided direct financial support to Estrada’s forces. Estrada himself estimated that American commercial interests on the East Coast of Nicaragua had contributed $1 million to the revolution.[34] Diaz was said to have lent the revolution $200,000 in American gold three weeks after it broke out, and later contributed another $400,000. It is inconceivable that this money was from his wages at La Luz y Los Angeles and even at the time opponents charged that Americans were funding the revolution.[35] Similarly, the revolutionaries acted against Zelaya with the expectation of receiving support from the US government. Moffat testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1927 that he had “heard intimations, that the American officials before him, and these naval officers, had been rather promising the people there- they said, “Why don’t you get up and get ride of Zelaya,” clearly a form of encouragement.[36] Moffat also said that he had heard a rumor that
“Some of our naval officers had said ‘Now some of the Americans up home are not satisfied with some of the concessions that are being interfered with, and Zelaya, they think, ought to be put out. They would be very glad to see him go out.’ And Estrada said he asked ‘Well, what would be the attitude of the American government? Would it be supported or not? They told him to go ahead; ‘you will get the support.”[37]
Thus, according to Moffat, the revolutionaries acted with the understanding that the American government would support their insurrection because Zelaya no longer abided by the rules of US economic hegemony in Latin America.
In early October, the State Department received “secret information” that a revolution against Zelaya would start on the 8th of October.[38] According to Moffat, an unknown man had knocked on his door late at night to deliver the information.[39] It is significant that the leaders of the rebellion sought to inform the representative of the US government of their plans; it bespeaks an unstated agreement that the US would not interfere with plans for revolution.
On October 10th, Moffat reported to the State Department that Estrada and his men had seized the Mosquito Coast without a single shot being fired and Estrada had been named provisional president of Nicaragua. Moffat reported that the “entire population is jubilant at the overthrow of Zelaya control on the coast…and that foreign business interests are enthusiastic.”[40] Revealing the affiliations and goals of the rebellious forces, Moffat added that “immediate reduction of tariff is assured; also the annulment of all concessions not owned by foreigners.”[41] The revolutionary government was clearly fulfilling the wishes of American business interests in the region by reducing tariffs and breaking up monopolies owned by Zelaya and other Nicaraguans, which had inhibited their own development. However, the State Department did warn Moffat not to intimate US recognition of the Estrada government at that time.[42] One newspaper speculated that the hesitation was due to the fact that the “recent successes by the insurgents seem almost to make interposition by this government unnecessary….If possible, the United States wants to see Zelaya overthrown by his own people, without the semblance of aid from this country.”[43]
The End of Zelaya
In Mid-November, Zelaya’s forces captured and executed two American citizens actively participating on the side of the revolutionaries. Zelaya’s army apprehended Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce who were working as explosive technicians when their attempt to dynamite the battleship Diamonte while it was sailing to put down the revolt failed.[44] Zelaya wrote to the state department that these men had confessed their intention to blow up his steamers.[45] Zelaya ordered Groce and Cannon to be executed, touching off a major crisis in US-Zelaya relations. Combined with the economic arguments that the two powers had been embroiled in for years, the execution of Groce and Cannon led to the “neutral” blockade of Bluefields, the deployment of 400 marines to the Greytown and Bluefields, and the severance of diplomatic relations between Zelaya and the United States.
The marines were deployed to the Mosquito Coast ostensibly to protect the lives and property of American citizens. They were to remain neutral in the fight. Moffat insisted that American relations with the revolutionary army had remained non-partisan throughout the war.[46] However, the US allowed Estrada’s forces refuge in the city as long as they did not bring the fighting into the city. At the same time, Zelaya’s forces were banned from the city and the blockade primarily affected ships carrying supplies for Zelaya’s forces.[47] Despite the supposed success of the revolutionary force, it became clear that they were no match for Zelaya’s army and that it was the safe haven of Bluefields, with marine protection, which prevented their decimation.[48] Although Estrada’s sallies from Bluefields resulted in decisive defeats, the protection of the marines prevented Zelaya from crushing the revolutionaries. It is clear that despite the supposed neutrality of the US government and its attendant army, the US was supporting the insurrection. The revolutionary forces, who promised to implement policies favorable to US economic interests and who were themselves connected to US commercial enterprises, were preferred to Zelaya, who had consistently acted in a manner contrary to US will. US policy reflected this preference by granting Estrada’s forces refuge, but not Zelaya’s. American commercial interests had merged with US policy as laid out by Roosevelt.
Diplomatic relations with Nicaragua were officially severed on December 1st, 1909 with the delivery of the Knox Note. On one level, Knox disapproved of Zelaya on a personal level since Knox, as noted, had ties to concessions that Zelaya was threatening to cancel. On another, Knox, was fully committed to a proactive approach to US foreign policy and believed that Zelaya had to go. In the note, Knox denounced Zelaya in the harshest of terms, saying that under Zelaya “republican institutions have ceased in Nicaragua to exist except in name” and that Zelaya’s regime had been nothing but a “blot upon the history of Nicaragua.”[49] He demanded reparation for the executions of Cannon and Groce and that those responsible be held accountable.
In response to the Secretary’s belligerent letter, Zelaya resigned from the office of president. In an address given before the Nicaraguan Legislative assembly on December 17th, Zelaya said
I desire that this determination shall contribute to the good of Nicaragua by the establishment of peace and above all, the suspension of the hostility manifested by the American Government to whom I do not desire to be a pretext that it may continue intervening in any way in the destiny of the country.[50]
Considering that his army was in a superior position, it seems credible that Zelaya truly did want an end to US intervention in Nicaragua. It would only be through a sustained or exaggerated US military presence that the rebellion might seize the government. Zelaya believed that by removing himself from office and designating a vocal critic of himself as president, he would remove the “pretext” for American intervention. With unanimous approval from the Nicaraguan Congress, Zelaya appointed Dr. Jose Madriz as President, a man known for his opposition to Zelaya’s policies and who had once called Zelaya a “dishonest public official who had trampled upon the laws of the Republic.”[51] A Mexican warship spirited Zelaya away to Santa Cruz, Mexico, but the desired cessation of U.S. intervention did not occur.[52] Knox made it clear that no government in anyway affiliated with Zelaya would be recognized by the US and authorized unofficial channels of communication with the rebels to be opened.[53] The fact that the US government refused to recognize Madriz illustrates that, despite their hesitation to officially recognize Estrada, they were decidedly behind his efforts to usurp the government and to install a candidate of their liking.
After Zelaya: Fulfillment of U.S. GoalsIt was not until the U.S. goal of imposing a president of its liking had been attained that the U.S. removed its “non-partisan” forces from Nicaragua. For U.S. commercial interests in the country and U.S. policy makers such as Knox, it was imperative to ensure that the next president was unaffiliated with Zelaya in any way and, as events in later years would prove, was answerable to the dictates of U.S. direction. Madriz, despite his opposition to Zelaya and his unanimous approval from the Congress, was unacceptable to the U.S. After a brief attempt at conciliation with the U.S. and rebel forces, fighting again broke out along the eastern coast. Madriz sent the warship Venus to bombard the rebel stronghold of Bluefields, where U.S. battleships Paducah and Dubuque were stationed to protect the town. Madriz’s forces were able to capture a strategically located customs house and intended to impose a blockade on Bluefields, thereby defeated Estrada’s forces. However, the U.S. insisted that no interruption of commerce would be tolerated, landing marines to back up the claim. The rebels and government forces had reached an impasse; neither side was able to defeat the other. Throughout the summer of 1910, government forces suffered a series of defeats as the U.S. navy blocked any attempt to crush the rebellion operating out of Bluefields. On 21 August, 1910, Madriz’s government finally collapsed. Shortly thereafter, Estrada was appointed president and Diaz, former employee of the U.S. & Nicaragua Company, was named vice president. Thus began U.S. economic and political rule of Nicaragua.
U.S. commercial interests on the ground in Nicaragua played an important role in shaping U.S. policy towards Zelaya. Repeated conflicts with him reaffirmed the State Department’s perception of him as a threat to U.S interests and therefore a threat to the larger U.S. policy of hemispheric domination. Zelaya’s independent manner clashed with the program set forth in Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in which the U.S. was the final judge in the western hemisphere. The cancellation of concessions to lucrative U.S. businesses at a time when the U.S. sought to promote its commercial endeavors globally proved disastrous to Zelaya, as the U.S. government proved that it was willing to intervene on behalf of those businesses. The agitation of the business community and the confluence of their interests with Washington’s stated policy toward the region resulted in the ousting of Zelaya and the beginning of U.S. political and economic domination of Nicaragua.
Works Cited
Secondary Sources Harold Norman Denny. Dollars for Bullets: the Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York: The Dial Press, 1929).Mike Gismondi and Jeremy Mouat. “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions on Nicaragua’s Mosquito Coast: reassessing the American presence, 1893-1912.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov., 2002), pp. 845-879.Michel Gobat. Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman. Dollar Diplomacy: A study in American Imperialism (New York: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925). Emily S. Rosenberg. Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Newspaper Sources“AMERICAN WOMAN DESCRIBES LIFE IN BLUEFIELDS: Interesting Sidelight on the Hotbed of Revolution.” The Washington Post (1877-1954), April 28, 1907, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/DIRECT WIRE TO THE TIMES. “ZELAYA PIQUED AT ROOT’S NOTE :Diplomatic Relations With Nicaragua Strained; Emery Claim Is at Bottom of the Dispute; Treaty of Commerce Off for the Present..” Los Angeles Times (1886-Current File), January 9, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ Special to The New York Times. “American Warships Sent.” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 13, 1909. http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ Special to The Washington Post. “SENDS CALL FOR WARSHIPS :Boston Company in Trouble with Nicaraguan Government. Its Mahogany Concession Summarily Abrogated —Minister Murray Goes to Guatemala City..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), January 5, 1907, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ Special to The New York Times. “NICARAGUA MUST ARBITRATE CLAIMS :Practical Ultimatum from Washington Sent on Thursday — No Answer from Zelaya. GOVERNMENT DETERMINED But Rule Against Collecting Debts by Force, Established in Venezuela Case, May Make Trouble..” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 21, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ “ZELAYA GETS FIGURES :Nicaragua Advised of Amount of Emery Claim. KNOX’S POLICY IS APPROVED Action by State Department May Pave the Way to an Amicable Settlement. At Cabinet Meeting the President and His Advisers Indorse Secretary’s Attitude Toward Central America..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), March 27, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ “HINGES ON A QUESTION :Dispute With Nicaragua Nears Its Final Stage. ZELAYA HAS YIELDED MUCH Manner of Determining and Amount of Damages Under Emery Claim Believed to Be Only Obstacle — No Fears Felt That Nicaraguan Activity Will Seri- ously Change Situation..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), March 25, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ Special to The New York Times. “TALK OF DIAZ’S AID TO REMOVE ZELAYA :No Confirmation at State Department of Story That We Have Suggested Joint Action. MORE WAR VESSELS GOING Evident That Washington Is Not Ready to Recognize the Insurgent Nicaraguan Government at Bluefields..” New York Times (1857-Current file), November 27, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/ U.S. State Department DocumentsMessage of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress (Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823; Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 3/03/1825; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives.Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress for 1904; House Records HR 58A-K2; Records of the U.S. House of Representatives; Record Group 233; Center for Legislative Archives; National Archives.U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Loans Hearing, Jan 25-27, Feb 16, 1927. Cong-Sess 69-2.Mr. Merry to Mr. Hay. March 5th, 1899. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1899), 554.Consul Moffat to the Secretary of State. Received October 7, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909).Consul Moffat to the Secretary of State. Received October 12 , 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909)The Acting Secretary of State to Consul Moffat. October 13, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909)The Secretary of State to the Nicaraguan Charge, December 1, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909)“Manifesto of President Zelaya to the National Assembly. Resigns power to deposit it in whoever may be named thereby,” received December 17, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909).Minister Heimke to Secretary of State, 26 Dec 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909)The Secretary of State to the Nicaraguan Charge, December 1, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909)
[1] Harold Norman Denny. Dollars for Bullets: the Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), 17.
[2] “AMERICAN WOMAN DESCRIBES LIFE IN BLUEFIELDS :Interesting Sidelight on the Hotbed of Revolution.” The Washington Post (1877-1954), April 28, 1907, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[3] Harold Norman Denny. Dollars for Bullets, 37.
[4] Michel Gobat. Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 66.
[5] Mike Gismondi and Jeremy Mouat. “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions on Nicaragua’s Mosquito Coast: reassessing the American presence, 1893-1912.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov., 2002), pp. 845-879
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.[9] Ibid.[10] Enclosure, American Legation, 23 June 1908 (describing the Emery mahogany concession in the Mosquito region), in American Legation Managua, Misc. Corr. 1908, vol. 2, RG 84, NA quoted in “Merchants, Mining and Concessions on Nicaragua’s Mosquito Coast.”
[11] Michel Gobat. Confronting the American Dream, 49.
[12] Ibid., 47.
[13] Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman. Dollar Diplomacy: A study in American Imperialism (New York: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925), 151.
[14] Michel Gobat. Confronting the American Dream, 69.
[15] Ibid.[16] Benjamin Teplitz, “The Political and Economic Foundations of Modernization in Nicaragua: The Administration of Jose Santos Zelaya, 1893-1909,” unpubl. PhD diss., Howard University, 1973, p. 132, and chapter 7, passim. Quoted in “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions on Nicaragua’s Mosquito Coast.”
[17] “Merchants, Mining and Concessions…”
[18] Ibid.[19] DIRECT WIRE TO THE TIMES. “ZELAYA PIQUED AT ROOT’S NOTE :Diplomatic Relations With Nicaragua Strained; Emery Claim Is at Bottom of the Dispute; Treaty of Commerce Off for the Present..” Los Angeles Times (1886-Current File), January 9, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[20] Special to The New York Times. “American Warships Sent.” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 13, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[21] “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions…”
[22] Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th Congress (Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823; Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 3/03/1825; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives.
[23] Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress for 1904; House Records HR 58A-K2; Records of the U.S. House of Representatives; Record Group 233; Center for Legislative Archives; National Archives.
[24] Emily S. Rosenberg. Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 41-43.
[25] Special to The Washington Post. “SENDS CALL FOR WARSHIPS :Boston Company in Trouble with Nicaraguan Government. Its Mahogany Concession Summarily Abrogated —Minister Murray Goes to Guatemala City..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), January 5, 1907, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu.
[26] Special to The New York Times. “NICARAGUA MUST ARBITRATE CLAIMS :Practical Ultimatum from Washington Sent on Thursday — No Answer from Zelaya. GOVERNMENT DETERMINED But Rule Against Collecting Debts by Force, Established in Venezuela Case, May Make Trouble..” New York Times (1857-Current file), March 21, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[27] “ZELAYA GETS FIGURES :Nicaragua Advised of Amount of Emery Claim. KNOX’S POLICY IS APPROVED Action by State Department May Pave the Way to an Amicable Settlement. At Cabinet Meeting the President and His Advisers Indorse Secretary’s Attitude Toward Central America..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), March 27, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[28] Ibid.[29] “HINGES ON A QUESTION :Dispute With Nicaragua Nears Its Final Stage. ZELAYA HAS YIELDED MUCH Manner of Determining and Amount of Damages Under Emery Claim Believed to Be Only Obstacle — No Fears Felt That Nicaraguan Activity Will Seri- ously Change Situation..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), March 25, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/
[30] Salisbury, President, US & Nicaragua Company, to Secretary of State Knox, 22 March 1909, M862, microfilm roll 283, NA. Quoted in “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions…”
[31] Denny, Dollars for Bullets, 72.
[32] Mr. Merry to Mr. Hay. March 5th, 1899. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1899), 554.
[33] “Merchants, Mining, and Concessions..”
[34] Denny, Dollars for Bullets, 79
[35] Ibid., 78[36] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Loans Hearing, Jan 25-27, Feb 16, 1927. Cong-Sess 69-2.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Consul Moffat to the Secretary of State. Received October 7, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 452.
[39] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Loans Hearing,[40] Consul Moffat to the Secretary of State. Received October 12 , 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 452.
[41] Ibid.[42] The Acting Secretary of State to Consul Moffat. October 13, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 453.
.
[43] Special to The New York Times. “TALK OF DIAZ’S AID TO REMOVE ZELAYA :No Confirmation at State Department of Story That We Have Suggested Joint Action. MORE WAR VESSELS GOING Evident That Washington Is Not Ready to Recognize the Insurgent Nicaraguan Government at Bluefields..” New York Times (1857-Current file), November 27, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu/
[44] Vice Consul Caldera to the Secretary of State. 20 Nov 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 448.
[45] President Zelaya to Vice Consul Caldera , 15 Nov 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 450.
[46] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Loans Hearing
[47] “WARSHIPS SENT AGAINST ZELAYA :United States Acts Quickly on Execution of Americans. RECOGNITION OFINSURGENTS Country Now Plans to Stop Strife in Nicaragua. TAFT WON’T SEE HAZERA Declines to Accept Credentials of New Minister From Nicaragua, Following Dispatching of Cruiser Des Moines and Gunboat Vicksburg to Scene — This Country Respects Blockade Established by Revolutionists — Reign of Terror in Panama, Where 500 Estrada Sympa- thizers Have Been Shot at Command of Zelaya’s Officer..” The Washington Post (1877-1954), November 19, 1909, http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy1.library.arizona.edu
[48] Denny, Dollars for Bullets, 78.
[49] The Secretary of State to the Nicaraguan Charge, December 1, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 455.
[50] “Manifesto of President Zelaya to the National Assembly. Resigns power to deposit it in whoever may be named thereby,” received December 17, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 458.
[51] “Vice Consul Caldera to Secretary of State” quoted in Denny, Dollars for Bullets, 85.
[52] Minister Heimke to Secretary of State, 26 Dec 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 459.
[53] The Secretary of State to the Nicaraguan Charge, December 1, 1909. U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1909), 455.
